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Since independence in 1963, Kenya has had a predominantly 
tax-funded health system, but gradually introduced a series 
of health financing policy changes. In 1989, user fees, or 
‘cost-sharing’ were introduced.1  User fees were abolished 
for outpatient care in 1990, inspired by concerns about social 
justice, but re-introduced in 1992 because of budgetary 
constraints. Until recently, these fees have remained, with their 
impact on access to health care the subject of several empirical 
studies.2-7 The user fee system was significantly altered in June 
2004, when the Ministry of Health stipulated that health care 
at dispensary and health centre level be free for all citizens, 
except for a minimal registration fee in government health 
facilities.
The most significant event since 1989 has been the 
government’s interest in social health insurance (SHI). The 
purpose of the latter is to ensure access to outpatient and 
inpatient health care for all Kenyans and to significantly reduce 
the out-of-pocket health care expenditure of households, 
especially the poorest.8  An intersectoral taskforce was 
established to prepare a national strategy and legislation as a 
first step in the preparation of Kenya’s National Social Health 
Insurance Fund (NSHIF) (Ministry of Health, Nairobi, Kenya 
– National Social Health Insurance Strategy Report, prepared 
by the Task Force on the Establishment of Mandatory National 
Social Health Insurance, 2003 (unpublished), and Mboya T, 
Stierle F, Sax S, Muga R, Korte R, Adelhardt M – Towards 
establishing national social health insurance in Kenya. Ministry 
of Health, Nairobi, Kenya, and Department of Standards 
and Regulatory Services (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany, 2004 
(unpublished)). Parliament passed the NSHIF Bill in December 
2004, but the president decided it still needed amendments and 
returned it to parliament for debate. 
The implementation of a well-run and effective NSHIF will 
be a formidable challenge. The main objective is nothing less 
than granting all population groups, including the poor, access 
to a comprehensive benefit package of health services. 
Key design features of the proposed 
NSHIF
When evaluating the proposed NSHIF, we have assessed the 
Kenyan government policy discussion papers, notably the 
Sessional Paper on National Social Health Insurance in Kenya  
(Sessional Paper)  and the National Social Health Insurance Fund 
Bill (Bill).9,10  Unless otherwise stated, figures used are from 
these documents. 
To assess the expected performance of the NSHIF in Kenya, 
we applied a conceptual framework developed to monitor and 
evaluate progress in social health insurance implementation.11  
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that ‘the 
purpose of health financing is to make funding available, as 
well as to set the right financial incentives for providers, to 
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Kenya has had a history of health financing policy changes 
since its independence in 1963. Recently, significant preparatory 
work was done on a new Social Health Insurance Law that, if 
accepted, would lead to universal health coverage in Kenya 
after a transition period. 
Questions of economic feasibility and political acceptability 
continue to be discussed, with stakeholders voicing concerns 
on design features of the new proposal submitted to the 
Kenyan parliament in 2004. For economic, social, political 
and organisational reasons a transition period will be 
necessary, which is likely to last more than a decade. However, 
important objectives such as access to health care and avoiding 
impoverishment due to direct health care payments should 
be recognised from the start so that steady progress towards 
effective universal coverage can be planned and achieved. 
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ensure that all individuals have access to effective public health 
and personal health care’.12  Hence we evaluate how well the 
NSHIF is expected to perform in relation to the following 
health financing targets: (i) resource generation (sufficient 
and sustainable); (ii) optimal resource use; and (iii) financial 
accessibility of health services for all.
Performance in relation to these targets is assessed against 
the three broad functions of health financing, viz. revenue 
collection, pooling and purchasing.13  Revenue collection is 
the process by which the health system receives contributions 
from households, enterprises, government and other 
organisations including donors. Pooling is the accumulation 
and management of these revenues in order to spread the risk 
of payment for health care among all members of the pool. 
Purchasing is the process by which these pooled contributions 
are used to pay providers to deliver a set of specified or 
unspecified health interventions. 
For each of these functions, key performance issues are 
identified and related to the realisation of health financing 
targets (Table I). Using this framework, performance of the 
NSHIF in these health-financing functions is evaluated through 
easily measurable indicators. 
Application to the proposed health 
financing reform in Kenya
The following assessment of expected performance of the new 
NSHIF rather than performance of the current NHIF is largely 
based on a series of six technical mission reports (TMRs) that 
resulted from advisory missions14 between 2003 and 2004. 
Revenue collection
Population coverage (rationale: to maximise the number of 
people with improved financial protection).
Performance indicator: Percentage of population covered by.
SHI. The NSHIF intends to systematically enrol the entire
population over a transition period, taking 9 years following 
implementation. Kenyan policymakers recognise that revenue 
collection from the self-employed is less straightforward than 
from the employed, although international experience suggests 
that 9 years remains a too-optimistic timeframe.15,16 
Subsequent reports envisaged more gradual transitions to 
universal coverage, with coverage levels at 60 - 80% 9 years 
after implementation (TMR No. 6). Rapid inclusion of the poor, 
however, is seen as a priority in the Sessional Paper, despite 
debate on the best way to finance this.  
Method of finance (rationale: to ensure adequate financial 
protection for SHI members).
Performance indicator: Ratio of prepaid contributions to total costs 
of the SHI benefit package. This ratio should be close to 100%, 
with the NSHIF financed through members’ contributions 
(income-rated for employees and employers, flat-rated for the 
self-employed), and government contributing on behalf of the 
poor. Contributions will be set so the NSHIF can cater for the 
complete cost of a comprehensive benefit package in all public, 
all mission and most private facilities. This is a response to the 
current NHIF’s limited financial protection. A radical change is 
expected, with 75% of total health expenditure to be financed 
through the NSHIF and the Ministry of Health, compared with 
44% in 2002.17  
Contribution setting has been sensitive to concerns of 
adverse effects on employment and compliance, with caps 
on contributions and lower flat-rate fees for dependents from 
larger households (TMR No. 6). Penalties for self-referral and 
minimal registration fees of 10 - 20 KSh at the outpatient level 
to help counteract potential moral hazard behaviour have also 
been suggested (TMR No. 3). 
Performance indicator: Percentage of households with catastrophic 
spending. By including all of the poor within the scheme and 
offering a more comprehensive benefit package, the NSHIF is 
expected to improve access and be more effective in reducing 
Table I. Health financing functions and targets
       Health financing targets
Health financing functions and key Resource generation     Financial accessibility of health
performance issues    (sufficient and sustainable)     Optimal resource use services for all
Revenue collection    X      X
Population coverage   X      X
Method of finance   X      X
Pooling     X   X   X
Composition of risk pool/s   X      X
Fragmentation of risk pooling        X
Management of risk pool/s      X 
Purchasing       X   X
Benefit package       X   X 
Provider payment mechanisms     X 
Administrative efficiency      X 
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catastrophic spending. This contrasts with the NHIF, where a 
recent study demonstrated that 10% of households using health 
services faced catastrophic expenditures in 2003, with the NHIF 
not reducing catastrophic expenditures.7 
Pooling
Composition of risk pool (rationale: to limit problems of 
adverse selection).
Performance indicator: Is membership compulsory in all/some 
contributing population groups? NHIF membership is 
compulsory for all employees and their dependents but 
voluntary for the self-employed. With the new NSHIF, 
membership will ultimately be compulsory for all, but 
voluntary for the self-employed during a transition period. 
Policies are being considered to ensure that not only high-risk 
individuals enrol into the scheme. 
Performance indicator: What percentage of each contributing group 
is covered by SHI? For private employees, and to a lesser extent 
public employees, the main reason for coverage not being 
100% immediately will be compliance. Measures to improve 
compliance are based on improving information exchange 
with business-registering authorities for registration, and 
with tax revenue authorities for contribution collection (TMR 
No. 2). For the self-employed and their dependents, coverage 
targets were initially 60% after 5 years, although more gradual 
implementation has been analysed (TMR No. 6).
Performance indicator: Are dependents of contributing groups 
compulsorily insured? Dependents will be compulsorily insured, 
as is the policy with the current NHIF. To help tackle fraud 
each individual above a minimum age will have his/her own 
membership card (TMR No. 2).
Fragmentation of risk pooling (rationale: to minimise 
horizontal inequities).
Performance indicator: Multiple risk pools? If yes, are there risk-
equalisation measures in place? The NSHIF will operate as 
a single risk pool, with all members entitled to the same 
benefit package thus avoiding fragmented risk pools. Health 
maintenance organisations (HMOs) will continue to play 
a role in financing the health system, by providing top-up 
supplementary health insurance. Despite the single risk pool, 
fragmentation may still be implicit because of variation in 
provider quality. Indeed, in the case of the current NHIF, 
membership and access to health services is lower in poorer, 
more remote geographical provinces. To limit disparities 
between the services offered in public and private facilities, 
public facilities will continue to receive partial subsidisation 
from the Ministry of Health for a number of years, for person-
nel costs and large infrastructure investments (TMR No. 3). 
Management of risk pools (rationale: to enhance technical 
efficiency).
Performance indicator: Are there efficiency incentives for the 
management of risk pool/s? Local branch offices are expected to 
have increased autonomy for claims processing and dealing 
with informal sector workers and their families. But there has 
been little discussion on policies to ensure that local branch 
offices actively engage in advocacy to speed up coverage, and 
to monitor and contract with providers (TMR No. 2).
Purchasing
Benefit package (rationale: to ensure that adequate health care 
services are received)
Performance indicator: Is the benefit package based on explicit 
efficiency and equity criteria? A comprehensive standard benefit 
package (SBP) is being developed for health services at 
each of the 5 levels in Kenya (these are: level I – dispensary, 
level II – health centre, level III – district/sub-district hospital, 
level IV – provincial hospital, and level V – national referral 
and teaching hospital). For certain services, notably long-
term care, patients may have to co-pay, although less than 
is currently paid out-of-pocket. Excluding certain services, 
such as orthopaedic appliances, and limited mortuary storage 
time, has also been discussed. Services for HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis will be included but accounted for separately and 
potentially co-financed initially through external mechanisms 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Health facility-
based preventive care will be included, although other 
preventive and health-promotion services will be under the 
remit of the Ministry of Health (TMR No. 3). Exclusions and/or 
greater levels of co-payment seem to be based purely on cost-
containment reasoning rather than explicit efficiency or equity 
criteria. 
Performance indicator: Are monitoring mechanisms – patient 
appeal mechanisms, full information on claimant rights, peer review 
committee and claims review – in place? General sensitisation 
of the population on the benefits offered by membership is 
underway (TMR No. 5). Active involvement of the population 
in the running of the NSHIF, along with an Appeals Tribunal, 
was originally planned, but is no longer viewed as necessary. 
Appointment of an independent ombudsman has also been 
offered as a monitoring mechanism (TMR No. 3). 
Provider payment mechanisms (rationale: to ensure good-
quality care is provided at the lowest possible cost).
Performance indicator: Do provider incentives encourage the 
appropriate level of care? A flat rate remuneration per inpatient 
day (daily payment) has been proposed. For outpatient care, a 
flat fee per visit (case payment) will be paid to providers. These 
mechanisms were chosen for their ease of administration and 
resemblance to current practice. Suggested remuneration levels 
are 1 500 - 2 500 KSh per inpatient day and 100 - 400 KSh per 
outpatient visit (TMR No. 2), estimated to cover the complete 
cost of the benefit package plus an extra allowance for 
improved quality and infrastructure development. Reductions 
in fee levels may also be considered in the short term if 
facilities cannot provide the full benefit package.
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Both methods create an incentive to treat patients at the 
lowest possible cost; this is beneficial for cost containment, but 
may lead to lower-quality treatment. This perverse incentive 
will be addressed by basing provider reimbursement levels on 
adherence to a set of health standards defined in the Kenya 
Quality Model (Mboya T, Stierle F, Sax S, Muga R, Korte R, 
Adelhardt M – Towards establishing national social health 
insurance in Kenya. Ministry of Health, Nairobi, Kenya, and 
GTZ, Eschborn, Germany, 2004 (unpublished)) (TMR No. 2). 
Daily payment for inpatient care may lead to supplier-induced 
lengths of stay that could be addressed through reduced rates 
after the first few days to discourage excessive stays, and 
monitoring by local branches. 
Administrative efficiency (rationale: to enhance technical 
efficiency).
Performance indicator: Percentage of expenditure on administrative 
costs. Administrative costs and reserves will not be permitted 
to exceed 8% of total NSHIF expenditures. Investments in new 
health facilities and expensive equipment will be excluded 
from the NSHIF’s remit. These are a response to major criticism 
of the NHIF, which in the past spent more than 25% of its 
budget on administration and 53% on investments. 
Financing of the NSHIF
Financial projections – feasibility of alternative 
contribution scenarios
Different financing options have been explored through the 
use of SimIns (using version 2 which is available via both the 
WHO and GTZ websites), a health insurance simulation model. 
Table II illustrates required government contributions, given 
different contributions from the salaried sector and assuming 
a more realistic implementation scenario (for a broader range 
of different expansion scenarios, the reader is referred to TMR 
No. 6 and TMR No. 3).
These results demonstrate that government contributions 
can be lower than the Sessional Paper recommendations 
in the early years of NSHIF implementation. This is due to 
only partial autonomy of government health facilities and 
with lower population coverage of the self-employed (whose 
contributions are partially cross-subsidised by the salaried 
sector). But in later years required government contributions 
will have to be at levels consistent with the Sessional Paper, 
with the government needing to make more difficult trade-offs 
between health and non-health sector allocations.
Areas of recent debate
Contributions from government tax revenues
The Sessional Paper stressed that earmarked taxes should 
contribute 11 billion KSh (2001 figures). Maintaining some 
government contributions was seen as imperative, given 
that contributions from the salaried sector would not be 
fully able to cross-subsidise the poor.  Timing of government 
contributions has been an important concern, however, 
including whether the government should wait for an 
improved macro-economic situation and whether the quality of 
health facilities should first be improved.16,18
Contributions from employees and their employers
Initial projections of the sources of finances for the NSHIF 
assumed that it would be possible to use medical allowances 
paid to civil servants and teachers, known as payroll 
Table II. Required government support for different contributions from the salaried sector (moderate population expansion 
scenario) 
       Years following implementation:
      +1 year     +2 years     +3 years     +6 years     +10 years
Population expansion scenario
Coverage
Total population coverage (%)        26      34         45           53             62
Exempted population coverage (%)        12      20         30           30             30
Required government contributions 
(KSh billion, 2004 prices, with % of general government 
expenditure in brackets)
Employee/employer contributions (% of salary)   
2.9 + 2.9                2.1      5.6          11.3          16.1             30.3
           (0.69)      (1.77)         (3.41)         (4.24)          (6.70)
3.5 + 3.5          0.5       3.9         9.4          13.7             27.3
           (0.17)      (1.23)         (2.84)         (3.61)          (6.03)
4.5 + 4.5          0.0        1.0         6.3           9.8              22.4
           (0.00)      (0.32)         (1.90)         (2.58)          (4.95)
Less ART provision*        -1.0     -1.6         -2.4           -3.9              -6.6
*In this case, the non-poor pay a 50% co-payment for antiretroviral treatment (ART). The poor remain fully covered. 
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harmonisation. Following opposition by concerned groups 
that view these allowances as part of their income, alternative 
policies based on paying a slightly higher rate contribution 
were analysed. Capping of contributions was also suggested to 
avoid some high-income earners contributing greater amounts 
than needed to secure private health insurance. 
Reimbursement of patients visiting high-cost 
private hospitals
To maximise choice of provision for the insured, it has been 
proposed that patients may visit one of 11 ‘high-cost’ private 
hospitals, but with the NSHIF reimbursing only up to the 
amounts paid for public, mission and other private facilities. 
Such patients would meet the balance of expenses through out-
of-pocket spending or private top-up insurance (TMR No. 6).
Organisation of the NSHIF
The NSHIF Bill requires an adjustment in the structure of the 
insurance organisation. A key component of this structure is 
a reformed Board of Trustees, including representatives from 
civil society, which appoints a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
who is responsible for defining the detailed vision and strategy 
of the NSHIF. 
New departments have also been proposed, namely:
1. Fraud and Investigation, to check the NSHIF’s financial 
activities, and to report directly to the Board of Trustees and 
ensure transparency and accountability of the NSHIF. 
2. Controlling, to focus on implementing procedures to check 
budget allocations within the NSHIF departments. 
3. Information Technology, to computerise and improve 
operations, contracting and quality assessment.
4. Marketing, to develop and implement the communications 
strategy of the NSHIF. 
5. Benefits and Quality, to define: (i) standards of health 
services for NSHIF members at each level of care; and (ii) the 
criteria for assessing the quality of health service delivery at 
individual health facilities. 
6. Contracting, to facilitate negotiations on provider payment 
methods and levels.
Initial response to the social health 
insurance proposal 
Stakeholders outside government have expressed their 
concerns with the NSHIF proposal (Table III), and potential 
solutions to some of these concerns have since been addressed 
in the various TMRs. Although concerns from the other 
stakeholders remain, the media consulted suggests that most 
stakeholders other than the health maintenance organisations 
(HMOs) have been supportive of the Bill.
Challenges in implementation
Implementation is facilitated through experience with the 
current NHIF. But it is imperative that the NSHIF be seen as a 
Table III. Summary of stakeholders’ responses to the NSHIF
Stakeholders       Initial responses 
Health maintenance organisations                    Private medical schemes and the quality of private care would suffer 
                      Equal NSHIF benefits will be to the detriment of the middle class 
                      Concern about government inefficiency and corruption
                      Higher contributions based on the payroll will lead to job losses
                      Insufficient information on the NSHIF and its cost
                      The poor should rather be protected via a direct budgetary
                       allocation from the Ministry of Health
Federation of Kenyan Employers                   Concern about paying higher contributions for their employees’ health insurance 
                      Fear of strife in the labour market due to a reduction of employee benefits 
National Nurses Association of Kenya                   Opposition to medical allowances being abolished
Kenya National Union of Teachers
Kenya Medical Association
Central Organisation of Trade Unions                      Concerns about governance for the NSHIF
Kenya Manufacturing Association
Kenya Medical Association                  
Health and HIV/AIDS Development   Concerns about transition to full coverage, particularly enrolment and provision of  
Partner Working Group*   preventive services for the poor, slow process of consultation with key partners and  
     insufficient attention to preventive health services and primary health care
Christian Health Association of   Agreement with the vision of NSHIF
Kenya Catholic Commission for Health 
and Family Life
*See Donor Coordination Group (DCG) Demarche Points, Health and HIV/AIDS Development Partner Working Group, 30 June 2004, Nairobi, Kenya (unpublished).
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new policy direction, given the criticism of the NHIF by several 
stakeholders. Testing new procedures on representative pilot 
region/s before they are introduced on a larger scale has been 
suggested. Working groups for core tasks of the NSHIF (TMR 
No. 2) have been set up. Progress has been made on training 
NHIF staff and the registration process, but much less has 
been done on tasks such as identifying the poor and revenue 
collection in local branch offices. A fuller evaluation of progress 
can be found in TMR No. 5. 
Which way next?
This article has assessed the NSHIF proposal in terms of key 
performance issues. Questions of economic feasibility and 
political acceptability continue to be discussed, with different 
stakeholders voicing concerns on a number of design features. 
For economic, social, political and organisational reasons, 
a well-prepared transition period that may last more than 
a decade will be necessary. However, objectives related to 
accessing health care and avoiding impoverishment due to 
direct health care payments should be recognised from the start 
so that steady progress towards effective universal coverage 
across the population can be planned and achieved. 
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